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is so clear and unambiguous that only one intent is reasonably inferable from it.7
Some authorities go even farther and say parol evidence is always admissible to help
explain the intent of the writer.8 "The distinction between words which are plain on
the face of a writing and words which are ambiguous on the face of a writing is based
upon the groundless supposition that there is an absolute meaning of words and that
people ordinarily correctly use those perfect words." 9
What was the intention of Morris in setting out the terms of his wife's will in his
letter? The language of the letter might be construed in two ways: (1) Morris prom-
ised not to revoke his will providing his wife's will left her entire estate to him for
life. This would make the terms of the will, as recited in the letter, an essential
condition of the contract, and therefore parol evidence would be inadmissible to
correct the mistaken recital. (2) Morris promised not to revoke his will providing
his wife did not revoke the will she executed on September 14, 1942. Under the
latter construction, the recital of the terms of the will was merely for the purpose of
identifying it. Parol evidence would be admissible to correct such a recital. Proof of
a partial error in description does not destroy the memorandum if the description
which remains after discounting the erroneous part is sufficient to identify the subject
matter.10 Here, since the will is described by date of execution as well as by a
purported recital of its terms, the recital could be shown to be mistaken and yet
contain enough description to be sufficient as a memorandum. In other words, the
recital is not an essential term of the contract and could therefore be treated as
surplusage.
The majority held without discussion that the language of Morris's letter was
clear and unambiguous and admitted of but one construction, namely, that the terms
of the will were set out as terms of the contract.1"
The minority contended a mistake in description was proven by the attorney's"
parol testimony; and that the testimony was admissible for this purpose; and for the
purpose of showing performance of the contract by Yetta, the promisee.12
Edwin F. Chase.
TORTS: DISOBEDIENCE OF A STATUTE-PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.-In the
recent case of Parmalee v. Bartolomeii the court held that "an act which is performed
in violation of an ordinance or statute is presumptively an act of negligence, but the
presumption may be rebutted by showing that the act was justifiable or excusable
under the circumstances. Until so rebutted it is conclusive." Plaintiff was driving a
truck down hill on a narrow road. Defendant was ascending the hill with his truck.
Plaintiff stopped when he saw, from a distance of 200 yards, that defendant was
'In re Smith's Will, 254 N. Y. 283, 172 N. E. 499 (1930) ; Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y. 138,
123 N. E. 139 (1919); cf. Calif. Code Civ. Proc., see. 861; Shean v. Weeks, 176 Cal. 592, 169 Pac.
231 (1917).8McBaine, "The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings," 31 Cal. L. Rev. 145
(1943) ; 9 Wigmore, "Evidence," sees. 2400, 2413, 2430, 2454 (3d ed., 1940).
'McBaine, "The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings," supra, page 148.
"Mansfield v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 205, 6 N. E. 386 (1886) ; Burr v. The Broad-
way Insurance Co., 16 N. Y. 267 (1857) ; Gardner v. Heyer, 2 Paige 11 (N. Y., 1829).
"In re Levin's Estate, supra, page 879.
"
2In re Levin's Estate, supra, page 881.
'106 A. C. A. 100, 234 P. 2d 1019 (1951).
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looking off to the side of the road. Defendant then ran into plaintiff. Defendant
contended that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in that,
since plaintiff was the driver of the descending vehicle on a road on which two vehicles
could not pass, he should have yielded the right of way to defendant as required
by statute.2 The trial judge, who also was the trier of fact, found that plaintiff was not
negligent: that plaintiff did not use excessive speed, he was looking where he was
going, and he "was using due and proper care."
California has predicated civil liability upon three theories where violations of
statutes or ordinances have been involved :3
1. The violation is to be treated as so much evidence of negligence. 4
2. The violation is negligence per se. 5
3. The violation raises a presumption of negligence. 6
The standard of the reasonable man may be established by the Legislature where
it enacts statutes primarily of a criminal nature." It is in these situations that the policy
and the rule of the Legislature takes precedence over the foresight of the reasonable
man, and so takes the question of negligence out of the hands of the jury.8 To predi-
cate negligence upon the violation, the party invoking the statute must show that he
was within the class to be protected and that the kind of evil sought to be avoided has
occurred.9
The court said, in the instant case, that a violation of a statute is only a presump-
tion of negligence, rebuttable by evidence of excuse or justification.1 ° As the court
stated in the Satterlee case "it is a question of fact whether the violation is excusable
'Cal. Vehicle Code, sec. 527.
'Note 35, Cal. Law. Rev., 464 (1947).
'Henderson v. Northam, 176 Cal. 493, 168 P. 1944 (1917): "... failure to perform a duty
imposed by statute is evidence of negligence." However, improper or illegal it may have been in
the abstract, an action for damages cannot be founded upon it."
'Alechoff v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corporation, 84 Cal. App. 33, 257 Pac. 569: "Under
ordinance it was clearly the duty of the defendant to regulate the magnitude of any fire it contem-
plated starting so as to control and extinguish it within the time limit prescribed by law. Having
failed to do this it was negligence ...It is an axiomatic truth, that every person while violating an
express statute is a wrongdoer, and as such is ex necessitate negligent in the eye of the law."
Accord: Fouch v. Werner, 99 Cal. App. 557 (1929) ; SieIners v. Eisin, 54 Cal. 418 (1880) ; Muir v.
Chesney Bros., 64 Cal. App. 2d 55, 148 P. 2d 138 (1944) ; Connard v. Pacific Electric Railway Com-
pany, 14 Cal. 2d 375, 94 P. 2d 567 (1939).
'Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P. 2d 279: "The presumption
of negligence arising from performance of an act in violation of a statute or ordinance is not
conclusive, but may be rebutted by showing that the act was justifiable or excusable under the
circumstances." Accord: Roth v. Bankston, 101 Cal. App. 274, 281, 283, 281 P. 1081 (1929),
"violation of an ordinance is presumptively an act of negligence and conclusively so until rebutted
by evidence that it was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances"; Jolley v. Clemens, 28 Cal.
App. 2d 55, 82 P. 2d 51; Prescott v. Orange, 56 Cal. App. 2d 295, 152 P. 2d 234; Wilkerson v.
Brown, 84 Cal. App. 401, 190 P. 2d 958 (1948) ; Tossman v. Newman, 37 A. C. 523, 233 P. 2d 1
(1951) ; Gallichotte v. California Mut. Assn., 4 Cal. App. 2d, 41 P. 2d 349 (1935) ; Mora v. Tavilla,
186 Cal. 199, 199 P. 17 (1921).
'Prosser on "Torts," p. 264, "the standard of conduct required of the reasonable man may be
prescribed by legislative enactment." Restatement, Torts, sec. 285, "The standard of the reasonable
man (a) may be established by a legislative enactment."
'Ezra R. Thayer, "Public Wrong and Private Action," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1913): "When such
a prohibition has been violated and the very evil aimed at by the law has been brought about,
approval of the wrong doer's conduct by the court is not consistent with proper respect for another
branch of the government." Accord note, 13 Cal. L. R. 428.
'Prosser on "Torts," p. 264 et seq. See, also, Justice Traynor, Satterlee case, 29 Cal 2d 581, 595.10234 P. 2d at 1020.
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or justifiable, and furthermore, it is a question for the trier of fact to decide. 1 Herein
lies the difficulty of using the formula of presumptive negligence.' 2 Since the Legis-
lature has set up the standard, to allow the jury to consider under what circumstances
one may violate the prescribed standard of conduct not only shows a disrespect for
the legislative authority but also defeats the object of such legislation. The net result
is that leaving the matter to the jury is tantamount to allowing the courts in a given
instance to overrule the Legislature by allowing laymen, in effect, to interpret the law,
a task which is formidable enough for the trained legal mind. Justice Traynor said
in the Satterlee case, "The conduct of the parties must be measured by that standard
(legislative) and the jury is not free to determine what a reasonably prudent person
would have done."'I s
In Berkovitz v. American River Gravel Company,1 4 the court, citing Shearman
& Redfield, states that the excuse or justification must be a sufficient defense to an
action for the penalty imposed by the law, in which case, the law is not really violated.
In our system of government we recognize the principle of separation of powers
and in keeping with that principle, once the standard is fixed by the Legislature, and
assuming its constitutional validity, the courts have no power to interfere. 15 Once
the Legislature has set the standard, the question of justification should not be a matter
for the jury to decide. 1  On the other hand, the excuse or justification may be such
that in the instance the statute or ordinance may not apply at all. In that case the
"Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District (supra, note 6) : "Whether the violation is excusable
or justifiable are questions of fact except in a case where the court is impelled to say that from
the facts reasonable men can draw only the inference that the negligence of the violator contributed
to the accident." Accord: Wilkerson v. Brown (cited supra, note 5) ; see, also, Jolley v. Clemens(supra, note 5) ; 14 Cal. Juris., negligence, sec. 68, p. 638.
"'See Justice Traynor's opinion in the Satterlee case (cited supra, note 6): The vice of such
statement is that it leaves to the jury the determination of the effect of a statute, a question of
law that properly belongs to the court. Presumptions are used in ascertaining what the facts are,
not in determining what the law is (see Wigmore, Evidence, 3d, sec. 2490) ." Cf. "Public Wrong and
Private Action," (supra, note 8).
""(Supra, note 6). Justice Traynor, p. 593: "I cannot agree, however, with the doctrine set
forth in the majority opinion that an act or failure to act in violation of a statute like the Vehicle
Code is merely 'presumptive evidence of negligence,' which may be rebutted by showing that the
act or omission was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances, with the excuse or justification
a question of fact for the jury. This doctrine is in effect a modified form of the doctrine that the
violation of a statute is in (herein used to include an ordinance) is merely evidence of negli-
gence . . .Since it is a question of fact for the jury whether the excuse or justification is sufficient,
the result is that one violating the statute need only offer proof that he acted as a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstance, and the jury is then free to conclude therefrom that he
was justified in violating the statute unless 'reasonable men can draw but one inference ... pointing
unerringly to .. .negligence'."
"(Cites Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 6th ed., sec. 467), 191 Cal. 195, 215 P. 675 (1923).
See, also, Restatement, Torts, 286, comment c. See Justice Traynor in the Satterlee case, p. 594.(Cited supra, note 6.) "If there is sufficient excuse or justification, there is ordinarily no violation of
a statute, and the statutory standard is inapplicable. If a statute is so drawn as not to be susceptible
of such a construction, so that it would impose liability without fault, the statutory standard is ordi-
narily not an appropriate one in a negligence case and should be rejected by the court." Restatement,
Torts, sec. 286, comment c: "If a criminal statute or ordinance prohibiting a particular act is
construed to permit such an act to be done under certain conditions without criminal responsibility,
such an act may be done under the same conditions without creating civil liability under the
statute or ordinance." Cf. Justice Traynor's opinion in the Satterlee case, supra, note 6.
"Supra, note 8.
""Courts under common law principles make the legislative standard controlling and take
the formulation of standard from the jury." Justice Traynor, Seatterlee v. Orange Glenn School
District, p. 595 (cited supra, note 6).
